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Abstract
In a (t, n) group-oriented cryptosystem collaboration of
at least t participants is required to perform a designated
cryptographic operation. This type of cryptographic op-
eration is very important to support an ad-hoc type net-
work, such as the one that is built using Bluetooth or
ad-hoc wireless LAN, since the existence of a combiner
is not required to decrypt an encrypted message. In the
earlier paper, it was shown that a group-oriented encryp-
tion scheme, as proposed by Saeednia and Ghodosi, can
be subjected to a conspiracy attack in which two partici-
pants collude to decrypt an encrypted message. Recently,
it was shown that the modified scheme is subjected to a
conspiracy attack of at least three group members with
probability 0.608. In this paper, we show a stronger result
that shows any conspiracy of at least three group mem-
bers can collude and decrypt an encrypted message.
Keywords: Conspiracy attack, cryptography, group-
Oriented Cryptosystem
1 Introduction
In a threshold cryptosystem the cryptographic power of
the transmitter, or the receiver, is distributed among a
group of n participants such that any t out of n partic-
ipants can perform the designated cryptographic opera-
tion.
Saeednia and Ghodosi [5] proposed a threshold encryp-
tion system that allows a group of t participants to col-
laboratively decrypt an encrypted message. An attractive
feature of the system was that public keys of users were
publicly verifiable.
We showed [6] that the scheme was vulnerable to a
conspiracy attack by two colluders.
In 2001, Ghodosi and Saeednia [3] proposed a modified
scheme that was resistant against this attack.
Very recently, Lee and Liao [4] showed that a conspir-
acy attack by three users can successfully decrypt an en-
crypted message with a probability 0.608.
In this paper, we strengthen the result of Lee and Liao
[4] by showing that the modified scheme is vulnerable to
any conspiracy attack by three or more users.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we briefly recall the scheme proposed in [3]. In Section 3,
we describe a conspiracy attack against the scheme and
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 A Self-Certified Group-
Oriented Cryptosystem With-
out a Combiner
For completeness, in this section, we briefly review the
scheme proposed in [3]. The scheme is as follows.
Model:
There is a group U1, U2, · · · , Un of n participants and a
trusted authority (TA).
Setup Phase:
TA chooses the following parameters:
• An integer N which is the product of two distinct
safe primes p and q (p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1,
where p′ and q′ are also prime integers).
• A prime F > N .
• A base α 6= 1 of order r = p′q′ mod N .
• A one way hash function h that outputs integers less
than p′ and q′.
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The authority makes (α, h, F, N) public, keeps r secret
and discards p and q.
Key Generation:
A group member Ui chooses his secret key xi, computes
its shadow zi = α
xi mod N , and sends zi to TA. He then
uses a zero-knowledge protocol to convince the TA that
he knows the secret key. TA chooses a random value ri
and sends it to Ui and also generates Ui’s public key as,
yi = (z
−1
i − IDi)
ID−1
i mod N,
where IDi = h(Ii) and IDi is the Ui’s identity (Ii can be
some information such as his name, address, etc).
Encryption:
If Alice wants to encrypt a message m (0 ≤ m ≤ N)
for the group, such that any t out of n receivers can re-
trieve and decrypt her message, then she will perform the
following steps.
1) Randomly choose an integer k and compute c =
α−k mod N .
2) Form a polynomial of degree t − 1 in GF (F ) such
that f(0) = αh(m) mod N . That is,
f(x) = a0 + a1x + · · ·+ at−1x
t−1
in GF (F ), where a0 = α
h(m) mod N .
3) Compute for i = 1, · · · , n,
wi = y
IDi
i + IDi mod N,
si = w
k
i mod N,
di = f(si),
ei = mw
h(m)
i mod N,
and send (t, c, di, ei) to Ui.
Decryption:
To decrypt a cryptogram, t group members must collab-
orate. If U1, · · ·Ut want to decrypt ciphertext c, first
Ui, i = 1, · · · t, calculates
si = c
xi mod N,
and broadcasts the pair (di, si). After t such pairs are
broadcasted, each Ui can recover v = α
h(m) mod N and
compute the plaintext message as
m = vxiei mod N.
3 Conspiracy Attack
We show a conspiracy attack in which a group of at least
three participants can decrypt an encrypted message.
Let U1, U2 and U3 be the colluding members and denote
their secret keys by X1, X2 and X3, respectively. Without
loss of generality, let X1 < X2 < X3, and X2 = X1 + R2
and X3 = X1 + R3.
The three colluding members U1, U2 and U3 receive the
encrypted messages,
e1 = mα
−X1h(m) (mod N),
e2 = mα
−(X1+R2)h(m) (mod N),
e3 = mα
−(X1+R3)h(m) (mod N),
and compute,
η1 =
e2
e1
= α−R2h(m) (mod N),
η2 =
e3
e1
= α−R3h(m) (mod N).
We consider three cases:
Case 1: gcd(R2, R3) = 1:
Colluders use the extended Euclid algorithm to compute
a2, a3 ∈ Z such that,
a2R2 + a3R3 = 1,
and find g−h(m) (mod N) as,
ρ = ηa21 η
a3
2 (mod N)
= α−(a2R2+a3R3)h(m) (mod N)
= α−h(m) (mod N).
Finally they decrypt the message as,
e1
ρX1
(mod N) =
mα−X1h(m)
α−X1h(m)
(mod N).
Case 2: gcd(R2, R3) = δ, δ 6= 1 and δ is small:
The colluders first compute δ = gcd(R2, R3) and set
R̃2 =
R2
δ and R̃3 =
R3
δ . Next, they use the extended
Euclid algorithm to compute a2, a3 ∈ Z such that,
a2R̃2 + a3R̃3 = 1,
and compute,
ρ = ηa21 η
a3
2 (mod N),
= α−(a2R2+a3R3)h(m) (mod N),
= α−δ(a2R̃2+a3R̃3)h(m) (mod N),
= α−δh(m) (mod N).
Finally U1 computes,
ζ =
eδ1
ρX1
(mod N),
=
mδα−X1δh(m)
α−X1δh(m)
(mod N),
= mδ (mod N),
and the problem is to find m, given ζ = mδ (mod N)
and δ. This is the well-known RSA problem which, if
δ < N0.292, is known to have an efficient algorithm [1,
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2, 7]). We note that TA does not know the secret keys
of participants and there is no way for the TA to enforce
this condition.
Case 3: gcd(R2, R3) = δ, δ 6= 1 and δ is large:
If δ is large, we will extend the attack, as shown be-
low, such that as the number of colluders increases their
success chance will also increase.
Let A(e1, e2, e3) denote a procedure that takes three
ciphertexts e1, e2 and e3 from three colluders P1, P2
and P3 respectively, use the methods described in Cases
1 and 2, and either outputs the message m, or Fail.
The extended attack repeatedly uses A(e1, e2, e3) for
subsets of three colluders until m is found. The attack is
summarised in the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3.1:
Conspiracy Attack (U0, U1, · · · , Ub, b ≥ 3)
V0 ← {U0, U1, U2}, i← 1, j ← 1, k← 2, l← 3.
Apply A(ej ; ek; el) :
while m is not found
do














Vi ← Vi−1 ∪ {Ui+2}
for all W ⊂ Vi, W ← {Uj, Uk, Ul}, j 6= k 6= l :
if A(ej , ek, el) 6= m
then choose another W
else stop
i← i + 1
The attack starts with three colluders and if m cannot
be found add colluders one by one until the message is
found.
Let us estimate how certain the conspiracy attack
would succeed. According to the Direichlet’s result, the
probability that given two integers chosen at random are
relatively prime is
Pr0 = 6/π
2 = 0.608.
So, Case 1 happens with very high probability. Since
the secret key xi is picked independently by each group
member, it is hard to avoid two keys from being relatively
prime. Even if the first match fails, the probability of
success increases as many members colluded. Given b
colluders, by noticing there are
(
b
2
)
pairs, the probability
of Case 1 is
1− (1− Pr0)
(b2−b)/2.
As shown in the well-known birthday problem, the attack
succeeds if we have the number of colluders given by
b =
√
(πw/6) = 1.283,
with probability 50%.
More precisely, we should consider probability of Case
2. Let Pr2 be the probability that the greatest com-
mon divisor of two uniformly chosen integers is less than
N0.292, i.e,
Pr2 = Pr[δ = gcd(R1, R2), 1 < R1, R2 < N |δ < N
0.292].
Instead of identifying Pr2, we estimate the expected value
of δ. If two integers R1 and R2 are even, the probability
is 1/4 and the gcd is 2. Hence, the expected value of gcd
is
E[δ] = Sumi=2,3,5,7,..,δ
(
1
i2
∗ i
)
< Sumi=2,3,4,..,δ
(
1
i2
∗ i
)
= Hδ − 1
where Hδ is a harmonic number. If we consider the
threshold value of δ is up to 11, the expected δ is
55991/27720 = 2.02, which implies that the gcd does not
increases. Therefore, we conclude that combining Cases
1 and 2 gives significant probability of attack.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that the modified scheme proposed in [3]
can be subjected to conspiracy attack by at least three
group members and hence is insecure.
This result strengthen the attack in [4] that showed a
conspiracy of at least three participants can successfully
decrypt an encrypted message with a probability 0.608. In
contrast to [4], we show that if at least three participants
conspire, then they will certainly be able to decrypt an
encrypted message.
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